

# Later Wittgenstein on ‘Truth’: A Therapeutic Reading

Philip Bold  
UMN, Twin Cities  
bold0169@umn.edu

**Abstract.** The most common and influential reading of later Wittgenstein’s remarks on truth is that he was a deflationist. This paper aims to clarify Wittgenstein’s approach to the concept of truth and show why he should not be considered a deflationist as that position is typically defined. Wittgenstein’s therapeutic conception of philosophy rejects traditional theoretical approaches to questions of truth. The formula “‘p’ is true if and only if p” neither explains the various roles of ‘proposition’ nor the various roles of ‘true’ and ‘false’. Further, Wittgenstein claims that ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’ are conceptually on a par, and that neither can be understood independently of the other. His therapeutic method draws attention to the reciprocal relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’, counteracting misleading pictures of their roles via careful description of varied word-use rather than strict adherence to a simple formula. I conclude that if one insists on labelling Wittgenstein a ‘deflationist’ according to some broader understanding of the term, then he should be called a ‘therapeutic deflationist’.

In philosophical discussion of this whole subject, very little attention has been paid to the actual use of ‘true’.

– P.F. Strawson, ‘Truth’

Let me suggest a diagnosis of our aporia about truth. We are still under the spell of the Socratic idea that we must keep asking for the essence of an idea [...] But the same ugly urge to define shows up in the guise of trying to provide a brief criterion, schema, partial but leading hint, in place of a strict definition.

– Donald Davidson, ‘The Folly of Trying to Define Truth’

## 1. Introduction

What is the later Wittgenstein’s view of truth? The most common and influential answer to this question is that Wittgenstein was a deflationist about truth.<sup>1</sup> I will offer a reading that challenges this common answer and shows that Wittgenstein’s therapeutic methodology is antagonistic to deflationism about truth as that position is typically defined.

Before attending directly to Wittgenstein, I will explain how the project of deflationism is commonly understood in section 2. In section 3, I summarize the major evidence that has been adduced to support the claim that Wittgenstein was a deflationist. In subsequent sections, I will give a focused and contextualized reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks about truth in the *Investigations* and explain why, contrary to the common and influential answer, he should not be considered a deflationist – at least not as that position is typically defined. In section 4, I identify core aspects of Wittgenstein’s methodology in the *Investigations* that will help to contextualize his relatively brief remarks about truth in PI 134-136. In section 5, I

---

<sup>1</sup> See especially Dummett (1978), Kripke (1982), Blackburn (2010), McGinn (1984), and Horwich (2010, 2018).

provide a focused reading of those remarks. In section 6, I explain why on this reading Wittgenstein differs importantly from deflationism about truth as that position is typically understood. In section 7, I conclude by suggesting that if one insists on labelling Wittgenstein a ‘deflationist’ according to some broader understanding of the term, then he should be called a ‘therapeutic deflationist’.

## 2. Deflationism about Truth

Let’s begin by considering deflationism about truth. The first thing to note immediately is that there are many different versions of deflationism – and there are disputes among deflationists about which version is best.<sup>2</sup> The version of deflationism that I will present, long defended by Paul Horwich, is called ‘minimalism’ – and is a view that Horwich claims to have inherited from the later Wittgenstein (Horwich 2010, vii, 114; Horwich 2018). The reason I will present this version of deflationism and not the others is not because the others are uninteresting or unimportant. Rather, I will focus on minimalism for ease of presentation. This focus will be harmless for making the more general point that Wittgenstein was not a deflationist, because (as we will see later) Wittgenstein’s differences with minimalism suffice to explain his differences with all other versions of deflationism.

A further reason for this restricted focus is that – as Horwich (2018, 290) argues – among the different versions of deflationism currently available, minimalism would be the most plausible attribution one could make to Wittgenstein. This is due to the fact that other forms of deflationism include technical and formal details that do not feature at all in Wittgenstein’s discussions. The comparatively minimal technical commitments of minimalism (requiring only acceptance of some notion of proposition, the truth predicate, and the biconditional) make it more plausible in light of later Wittgenstein’s distaste for technical formalism as well as his general avoidance of theoretical baggage. However, I will show that Wittgenstein’s departure from minimalism would not be for technical reasons, and has more to do with the very aims of deflationism in any of its forms. So, again, it will not affect my argument that I do not consider *every* version of deflationism.

Deflationists are best understood by first seeing what they reject. Deflationists are suspicious of any general theory of truth that considers truth to be a substantive property and the subject of metaphysical investigation or inquiry. For instance, deflationists are suspicious of claims to the effect that ‘truth is correspondence to reality’, or that ‘truth is coherence among our beliefs’, or, as some pragmatists have suggested, that ‘truth is what it is most helpful to believe’. All these theories of truth attempt to identify a special property that all ‘truths’ possess and of which we can give a substantive metaphysical account. Deflationists, by contrast, are impressed by the following schema (or some relevant version of it):

---

<sup>2</sup> See Armour-Garb & Woodbridge (forthcoming) for a useful survey of deflationist accounts of truth.

(T) The proposition that p is true if and only if p.<sup>3</sup>

According to deflationists, this schema tells us everything we need to know about truth. There's thus no substantive account of truth to be given. All you need to know is that asserting a proposition is true is equivalent to asserting that very proposition. In this sense, 'the concept of truth is superficial and trivially explainable' (Horwich 2010, 4) – it is fully captured by (T).

Given that truth is a thin and superficial concept that (as it were) piggybacks on propositions, (T) shows that the concept of a proposition (and of propositional meaning) is more fundamental than the concept of truth (*ibid.*, 17) – and thus studying the meanings and roles of propositions is a fruitful and informative endeavor. As Horwich puts it, 'the concept, MEANING, is more fundamental than the concept, TRUTH' (*ibid.*, 17, 50-53). – This clearly differentiates deflationists from the tradition of 'truth-conditional semantics', championed by Donald Davidson, which by contrast aims to shed light on the concept of meaning via the concept of truth (Davidson 1984).<sup>4</sup> – According to deflationists, while propositional meaning is an interesting subject of inquiry, truth is trivially explainable as soon as propositional meaning is understood. So long as one understands that any instance of (T) is correct, then they fully understand the concept of truth. End of story. In Horwich's own words, 'no further fact about the truth predicate—nothing beyond our allegiance to [(T)]—is needed to explain *any* of our ways of using it' (Horwich 2010, 37).<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Deflationists disagree with one another regarding the best formulation of (T) or 'the equivalence schema'. For instance, other versions appeal to sentences rather than propositions, or relativize truth to a specific language, and so on. Deflationists also differ regarding how exactly the equivalence should be understood. But these differences will not matter for our purposes. Wittgenstein's objections to deflationism will not hinge on these technical differences among deflationists. But to be clear, the propositional formulation of (T) as I have written it here is the formulation of Horwich's preferred view known as minimalism. For a survey of different versions of deflationism and their technical differences, see Armour-Garb & Woodbridge (forthcoming).

<sup>4</sup> And indeed Horwich (2010, 50-53) highlights the fundamental priority of MEANING over TRUTH in order to differentiate the deflationist position from a Davidsonian approach to those concepts. The major reason why Horwich believes that deflationism requires treating MEANING as more fundamental than TRUTH is the following: 'According to deflationism, the basic rule we follow in our use of "true" is to apply it to a statement, s, when we take s to have the same content (i.e., meaning) as something we are already disposed to assert. For example, we agree that "Schnee ist weiss" expresses a truth, because we know that it means the same as a sentence of our own that we accept. [...] [O]ur possession of the concept of TRUTH [...] presupposes that we be able to recognize "sameness of meaning". Thus the concept, MEANING, is more fundamental than the concept, TRUTH' (Horwich 2010, 17). Field (1994) suggests that a deflationist theory of meaning and content would include an account of the conceptual role of an expression as well as external conditions such as its 'indication-relations' (254). The point for our purposes is that deflationists view the role of the truth-predicate as thin and trivial, whereas the 'meaning' of an expression can be given a substantive (albeit non-truth-theoretic and non-truth-conditional) account.

<sup>5</sup> As Bartunek (2019, 4094) puts it, 'It is specific for the deflationary-redundancy theory to claim that [(T)] exhibits *all* we can say about truth: we can't say anything else about it.'

The only other feature of truth that is worth noting, according to deflationists, and that explains why we need a concept of truth at all, is that it allows us to make certain generalizations that would otherwise be inexpressible (Horwich 2010, 4-5). For instance, the truth predicate allows us to say things like, ‘Everything Tamara said yesterday is true’. Now, if I had heard everything Tamara said yesterday, I *could* simply list off every proposition that she asserted (in which case we would not need the truth predicate at all), but I can also make the generalization without having such a list, indeed without even *knowing* what she asserted. Perhaps I have enough faith in her reliability to know that whatever she asserted, it is bound to be true. Deflationists will sometimes say that truth is thus a merely ‘expressive’ device, one that allows us to make these sorts of generalizations, but not much else (Horwich 2018, 289).

Once we recognize that any instance of (T) is correct and that the word ‘true’ allows us to make useful generalizations, we have said everything there is to say about the concept of truth. – To be clear: *modulo* everything deflationists might need to say to defend their thesis against objections (of which there have been many).<sup>6</sup> – This position allows the deflationists to clearly differentiate themselves from any substantive theory of truth (such as correspondence theory, coherentism, or pragmatism), while also allowing them to tell a complete story (however thin or superficial it might seem) about the role of truth in our language.

### 3. Evidence that Wittgenstein was a Deflationist

What reason, then, do we have to think that *Wittgenstein* was a deflationist? Horwich (2018, 289) lays out the available evidence for this claim, which I will briefly summarize here. The major reason is that Wittgenstein at various points in his life held to a version of the deflationist’s schema (T). We find this in writings as early as his *1914-16 Notebooks*, which contain his developing thoughts leading up to the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.

“p” is true says nothing else but p. (NB, p. 9)

Wittgenstein repeatedly makes remarks like this in the so-called ‘transitional period’ of his writings long after the *Tractatus* (roughly around 1930-34).<sup>7</sup> But most importantly for our purposes we find a suggestive version of (T) in the *Philosophical Investigations* (the first draft of which included this remark and was written around 1937).

‘p’ is true = p  
‘p’ is false = not-p. (PI 136)

---

<sup>6</sup> See Armour-Garb & Woodbridge (forthcoming) for a survey of common objections to deflationism.

<sup>7</sup> See especially PG 79 and BT 18.

Another reason why folks have thought that later Wittgenstein was a deflationist is that he cites Frank Ramsey as a major influence on the *Philosophical Investigations*, and Ramsey famously defended a version of deflationism known as the redundancy theory of truth.

Combine all these considerations with Wittgenstein's general hostility to metaphysical theorizing, and it seems we have a good case that Wittgenstein was himself a deflationist about truth. Again, the idea being that once we recognize that asserting that p is true is equivalent to asserting p, then we have said everything there is to say about truth.

A more circuitous route to this conclusion (taken by Horwich) is that deflationism about truth is especially amenable to other alleged commitments in the *Investigations*, for instance the so-called 'use-theory of meaning'. Further, Wittgenstein's antagonism to the so-called 'Augustinian picture of meaning', according to which the meaning of a word is the object to which it refers, indicates that Wittgenstein would have likewise been attracted to a deflationist theory of reference.<sup>8</sup> Horwich sees these commitments as naturally going hand-in-hand with deflationism about truth.

These considerations are suggestive, but a more contextualized reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on 'truth' in the *Investigations* tells a different story.<sup>9</sup> In section 4, I will explain the broader context of the *Investigations* that will inform my reading. Two aspects of that context deserve special note: (1) we need to consider the project of the *Investigations* and the distinctive method of philosophy that Wittgenstein there deploys, and (2) we need to recognize that Wittgenstein's remarks about truth are part of a sustained self-critique of his own views about the 'essence of the proposition and of language' in the *Tractatus*.

I should note explicitly that my aim is to better *understand* what the later Wittgenstein had to say about 'truth'. I am *not* aiming to *defend* or give an *argument* on Wittgenstein's behalf that is intended to persuade everyone. It is hard enough as it is to adequately explain what Wittgenstein thought – and since I think his understanding of 'truth' is regularly mischaracterized as expressing a commitment to deflationism, my specific focus will be to clarify his view. In clarifying his view, I will inevitably appeal to commitments and assumptions that are disagreeable to many philosophers, though they are ones that Wittgenstein himself clearly held.

---

<sup>8</sup> See Horwich (1998, Ch 5) for his deflationist account of reference. The view is summarized as follows: '[A]n uncontroversial starting point [for a theory of reference] is to acknowledge that "Aristotle" refers to Aristotle, "the capital of Sicily" refers to the capital of Sicily, and so on. Anyone who has the concept of reference is able to recognize such facts. The question we must now address is whether these trivialities are not merely the start of the story, but the whole story. [...] Is there any reason to expect a theory which goes deeper than disquotation—a theory that provides some sort of reductive analysis of the reference relation, specifying what reference is? The deflationist answer is No' (117-118).

<sup>9</sup> However suggestive, I agree with McFarland (2020) that the evidence as it has been presented here is insufficient to ascribe a deflationary or redundancy account of truth to Wittgenstein. But I will make the stronger argument that deflationism is incompatible with Wittgenstein's remarks on a contextualized reading of PI 134-136.

#### 4. The Context of Wittgenstein's Remarks on Truth in the *Investigations*

##### (i) *The Therapeutic Conception of Philosophy*

The reading that follows relies on Wittgenstein's later, therapeutic conception of philosophy, as I understand it. This 'conception' is not a theory or description of all the things *we* might happen to call 'philosophy', but Wittgenstein's own radical conception of how philosophy should be done – 'radical' in that it disrupts the traditional philosophical mode of treating certain questions or problems as innocent and answering them directly by way of an account, definition, or theory.<sup>10</sup>

By contrast, on Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, philosophical questions are themselves an object of suspicion and require an investigation of their sources without any aspiration to theory (PI 255, 109). They are treated 'like an illness' and thus submitted to diagnosis and therapy (PI 255, 133). Since these characterizations are intended to be analogical or metaphorical ('The philosopher treats a question *like* an illness' (PI 255, my emphasis); 'there are indeed methods, different therapies, *as it were*' (PI 133, my emphasis)), I unpack them as follows.

Wittgenstein's general 'diagnosis' of philosophical problems is that they stem from misunderstandings about the uses of words due to one's lacking a proper overview (*übersicht*) of our language (PI 110, 111, 122). One major aspect of language that encourages such misunderstandings is the apparent similarity between different kinds of words (PI 11); confusions arise when they are assimilated despite important differences between their uses (PI 90, 112; BT 302–303). Such confusion often yields misbegotten 'pictures' of the meanings of those words (PI 1, 115), which take hold of the philosopher's imagination and are effectively counteracted with reminders about how those words are ordinarily used (PI 116, 126, 127).

Wittgenstein's 'diagnosis' of philosophical questions and problems is at the core of his notion of philosophical 'therapy'. The misunderstandings about language that give rise to philosophical puzzlement can only be counteracted by *describing* the uses of words and drawing out differences between them (PI 69, 75, 109) – differences that might easily be overlooked due to their surface similarities.

A common tool in Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy is his use of language-games (PI 130). The value of language-games (especially those that are fictional) is to serve as 'objects of comparison', designed to throw light on features of our *actual* language (*ibid.*). Language-games, whether actual or fictional, also articulate a kind of ideal – an 'overview' (*übersicht*), the lack of which, according to Wittgenstein, is the major source of misunderstandings. When language-games are described in sufficient detail traditional philosophical problems about meaning do not arise (PI 1, 126).

Thus, generally speaking, philosophical 'illnesses' are confusions about the uses of words due to a lack of oversight (*übersicht*); philosophical 'therapy' counteracts such confusions by careful description of and attention to ordinary

---

<sup>10</sup> This differentiates my reading from Connelly's (2013) proposal that 'Wittgenstein defends a robust and substantive, rather than deflationary conception of truth-aptness' (571).

word-use, deploying (sometimes fictional) language-games to highlight aspects of use or features of our language that might otherwise be ignored.

This is Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception of philosophy in a nutshell, the further clarification of which (by his own lights) must be 'demonstrated by examples' (PI 133). The application of Wittgenstein's therapeutic method articulated throughout the remainder of this paper will serve as one such example.<sup>11</sup>

(ii) *Wittgenstein's Self-Critique of his Earlier Views*

Another aspect of Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception that is helpful to bear in mind for understanding his remarks on the concept of truth is that any therapy requires a subject or participant in said therapy. If we are going to diagnose a question as arising from certain kinds of confusion about language, we need to consider *who* is asking the question and what more specifically is motivating *that person* to ask it in the way that they are. An investigation of their presuppositions and motives will help to clarify *their* question by showing us what sorts of requirements they are placing on an adequate answer. And in some cases, the critical diagnosis of a subject's question is best revealed by examining (often implicit) requirements on an adequate answer. – Careful examination of those requirements might show them to be ill-founded or based on a confusion about the relevant terms.

The reason why this bears mentioning is that Wittgenstein's remarks on truth in passages 134-136 are part of a self-therapy or self-critique of his own earlier views in the *Tractatus*.<sup>12</sup> As he puts it in the Preface to the *Investigations*,

Four years ago, however, I had occasion to reread my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas. Then it suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old ideas and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my older way of thinking.

So we will not understand the significance of those remarks unless we recognize that, above all, his primary targets in these passages are his own earlier confusions about the essence of language.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> For further examples see Bold (2022, 2023, 2024a, 2024b).

<sup>12</sup> Wawrzyniak (2023) likewise emphasizes that 'it is almost impossible to interpret these parts of the text properly without invoking thoughts expressed in Wittgenstein's earlier writings' (6).

<sup>13</sup> Bartunek (2019) also argues that Wittgenstein's view in the *Investigations* is antagonistic to a 'deflationary-redundancy' account of truth. But her reading of PI 136 is that Wittgenstein 'is actually advocating for his own discoveries about the truth-functional calculus in the *Tractatus*: that it has an important role in establishing propositional meaning' (4097) and that he specifically seeks to revive 'the idea that a proposition is meaningful if (and only if) it is bipolar' (4098). On my reading, Bartunek's proposal fails to appreciate Wittgenstein's thorough self-critique of his earlier views about truth and propositions and the workings of his therapeutic methodology in the *Investigations*. My reading agrees with Hacker's (2001) observation that for the later Wittgenstein 'The concept of a proposition, contrary to what he had argued in the *Tractatus*, is a family resemblance concept.'

Framing the situation in these terms can seem disappointing to philosophers, who might prefer to know Wittgenstein's 'general view' or his 'arguments' against a more general philosophical position, rather than seeing a kind of solipsistic battle between the younger and elder Wittgenstein. But it is important to remember that much can be learned from a detailed case study (indeed, this is a fundamental element of literal, medical therapy – which requires practical knowledge gained from experience with various participants). I will try to highlight more general lessons about truth (or at least what Wittgenstein would take to be such lessons), but only after working through the details of his own self-critique (since that is what takes place in these passages). As we will see later, the reasons why Wittgenstein eventually rejected the major project of the *Tractatus* carry over quite naturally to the deflationist's aim to tell a simple and complete story about truth.

Obviously, interpretation of the *Tractatus* is itself a matter of scholarly debate. I am only going to say as much about the *Tractatus* as is needed to understand the specific critique Wittgenstein offers in PI 134-136.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein sought to give an account of the essence of language by way of revealing what he called 'the general form of the proposition' (TLP 4.5). Any proposition is either elementary or composed of truth-functional combinations of elementary propositions (TLP 5). Elementary propositions are collections of names that refer directly to simple objects and are put into a certain arrangement (TLP 4.21, 4.22). In this sense, any proposition is a 'picture': it refers to objects and specifies their arrangement (i.e., a state of affairs) in a fully determinate way (TLP 2.031, 2.032, 2.14, 2.15). This is known as the doctrine of the 'determinacy of sense' (shared with Frege):<sup>14</sup> that a meaningful proposition can involve no ambiguity whatsoever about what it refers to or whether it is true (TLP 3.23, 4.063). A proposition can be either true or false (with no gray area) by virtue of determinately representing a state of affairs (TLP 2.21, 2.221, 2.222, 4.06, 4.063). Whether a proposition is indeed true or false is established by comparing that proposition with the facts that make up the world (TLP 2.223).

The positive account of propositions is meant to reveal the essence of language – which exclusively consists of propositions that tell us that the world is 'thus and so' (TLP 4.5). Anything that does not adhere to the general form of the proposition is strictly speaking meaningless. This infamously includes all talk of beauty, morality, religion, the meaning of life, or any matter of necessity (such as we find in logic and mathematics), among other things (TLP 4.003, 6.111, 6.2, 6.42). Anything that *looks like* a proposition but that fails to adhere to the general form of 'picturing' is considered either a senseless (*sinnlos*) or a non-sensical (*unsinnig*) pseudo-proposition – in which case we have no business calling it either 'true' or 'false'.

---

Many different kinds of linguistic structure are called "propositions", and they are united not by a common essence but by overlapping similarities. Bipolarity is an important feature of *some* members of the family, but not of all. It was dogmatism to deny to the equations of arithmetic (or the theorems of geometry) the status of propositions' (339).

<sup>14</sup> See Hacker (2021, 58ff) for discussion of the determinacy of sense in the *Tractatus* and its Fregean roots.



Wittgenstein in the *Investigations* offers a sustained and thorough critique of the *Tractatus*. First, he criticizes his presupposition of the so-called ‘Augustinian picture’ that the meaning of any word is the object for which it stands (PI 1ff). Second, he critiques the notion of ‘absolute simples’ that are meant to be revealed by any exhaustive analysis of a proposition (PI 46ff). Third (and related to the previous), he critiques the idea that the *meaning* of an expression is revealed via a reductive analysis – and replaces this with his famous suggestion that by and large the best way to understand the meaning of an expression is to look at its use (PI 43ff).<sup>15</sup> And fourth, he critiques the ‘determinacy of sense’ by suggesting that expressions can be meaningful without being completely determinate – allowing for vagueness and gray area in our ordinary concepts (PI 70ff). The foregoing critiques are not the immediate focus of this paper – I mention them only to make clear that Wittgenstein’s remarks on truth are part of this sustained critique of his earlier views. In section 5, I will turn directly to passages 134-136 – the only place where the concept of truth is discussed explicitly in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

## 5. ‘Truth’ and ‘Propositions’ in PI 134-136

As we have seen, in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein sought to answer the question ‘What is the essence or general form of the proposition?’ and eventually gave the answer that ‘The general form of a proposition is: This is how things stand’ (TLP 4.5). PI 134 thus begins,

Let’s examine this sentence “This is how things are”. – How can I say that this is the general form of propositions? – It is first and foremost *itself* a sentence, an English sentence, for it has a subject and a predicate. But how is this sentence applied – that is, in our everyday language? For I got it from *there*, and nowhere else.

(PI 134)

The issue with stating that ‘This is how things are’ is the general form of propositions is that this itself is just a sentence taken from our ordinary language – thus leaving open the question of how the ordinary sentence is used and thus what it means. It is not as if its meaning is self-evident and can be used on its own to clarify what a proposition is or does. But these considerations apply quite generally to other schemata that one might be tempted to use, e.g., that propositions ‘represent or correspond to reality’, or that they ‘can be true or false’, or that they, if true, ‘tell us how the world is’, and so on. These expressions, just as much as ‘This is how things are’, are ordinary expressions from our language and leave us the task of answering how they themselves are used – what sense they themselves have if they have any sense at all. Wittgenstein continues by describing an ordinary use of the phrase ‘This is how things are’, a clear instance of ‘bring[ing] words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use’ (PI 116).

---

<sup>15</sup> Though compare TLP 3.262.

We say, for example, “He explained his position to me, said that this was how things were, and that therefore he needed an advance”. So far, then, one can say that this sentence stands for some statement or other. It is employed as a propositional *schema*, but *only* because it has the construction of an English sentence. (PI 134)

In this ordinary English sentence, the expression ‘This is how things are’ refers to some previous claim made by the person who explained their position. Thus it stands in as a ‘propositional *schema*’ because this is the use of that ordinary English sentence. But its use in that instance is not to unveil the essential inner-workings or role of propositions, but instead merely to point toward something that has already been said. Again, the phrase ‘This is how things are’, is not special in this regard, as we could have used other expressions to play the same role here.

One could easily say instead “such-and-such is the case”, “things are thus-and-so”, and so on. One could also simply use a letter, a variable, as in symbolic logic. But surely no one is going to call the letter “p” the general form of propositions. To repeat: “This is how things are” had that role only because it is itself what one calls an English sentence. But though it is a sentence, still it gets used as a propositional variable. To say that it agrees (or does not agree) with reality would be obvious nonsense, and so it illustrates the fact that one feature of our concept of a proposition is *sounding* like one.

(*ibid.*)

So, for instance, we could rephrase the sentence earlier as, ‘He explained his position to me, said that p and that therefore he needed an advance’, which could achieve the same effect (amongst logicians or analytic philosophers, presumably!). But if ‘p’ is playing that role here, then ‘no one is going to call the letter “p” the general form of propositions’. Its function in this context is simply to refer back to something previously said rather than to reveal the essence of anything. Thus, ‘to say that it agrees (or does not agree) with reality would be obvious nonsense’, since such a claim is completely disconnected from the role of ‘p’ or ‘this is how things are’ in the ordinary sentence above. This then ‘illustrates the fact that one feature of our concept of a proposition is *sounding* like one’ because the variety of schemata which we think are akin to one another (‘This is how things are’, ‘such-and-such is the case’, ‘things are thus-and-so’) reveal the ways a proposition must *sound* in order to count as a proposition. However, these phrases do nothing on their own to reveal the general nature, form, essence, or role of propositions.

But even if ‘This is how things are’ (etc.) does not reveal the general form of propositions, shouldn’t we look for something better? That is, shouldn’t we look for a better definition or account of propositions? PI 135 aims to undermine this natural philosophical temptation by connecting Wittgenstein’s famous discussion of games and family resemblances to propositions.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> As Hacker (2001, 339) puts it, ‘The concept of a proposition, contrary to what he had argued in the *Tractatus*, is a family resemblance concept. Many different kinds of linguistic structures are

But haven't we got a concept of what a proposition is, of what we understand by "proposition"? — Indeed, we do; just as we also have a concept of what we understand by "game". Asked what a proposition is – whether it is another person or ourselves that we have to answer – we'll give examples [...]. So, it is in *this* way that we have a concept of a proposition. (Compare the concept of a proposition with the concept of a number.) (PI 135)

So, it is of course true: we have a concept of what we understand by 'proposition' – just as we have the concepts 'game' and 'number'. But earlier in PI 66, Wittgenstein explains that there is no one thing that games all have in common by virtue of which they are all games, but instead are connected by 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and small'. This fact about how the various things we call 'games' are related to one another is famously summarized with the analogy of 'family resemblances'.

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family [...] overlap and criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say: 'games' form a family. (PI 67)

Wittgenstein's comparison with 'the concept of number' in PI 135 makes it certain that Wittgenstein is referring to these earlier passages. PI 67 continues:

And likewise the kinds of number, for example, form a family. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it has a – direct – affinity with several things that have hitherto been called "number"; and this can be said to give it an indirect affinity with other things that we also call "numbers". And we extend our concept of number, as in spinning a thread we twist fiber on fiber. And the strength of the thread resides not in the fact that some one fiber runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of the many fibers. (PI 67)

Thus, aside from the fact that a generalization such as 'This is how things are' tells us nothing interesting about the role of propositions, it is a mistake to look for *the general form* of propositions in the first place. There are many different things we call 'propositions' – 'proposition' is a family resemblance concept (c.f., PI 108). As he puts it in *On Certainty*, 'the concept "proposition" itself is not a sharp one' (OC 320). Given that there is no *common feature* by virtue of which all propositions are propositions, our best hope of clarifying what 'propositions' are must go by way of providing various examples. (So, to be clear, Wittgenstein is not saying that *no common feature can be found*, but rather that none would tell us *what a proposition really is* or *reveal its essence*. E.g., One might say 'A proposition is a sentence in

---

called "propositions", and they are united not by a common essence but by overlapping similarities.' McFarland (2020) likewise highlights the role of family resemblance in PI 134-136.

front of which you can meaningfully place “It is true:”.’ – Compare PI 137. – That might be a common feature of what we call ‘propositions’, but it certainly does not reveal their general nature, role, or essence. A range of well-selected examples would be much more informative.)

Such a list of examples (albeit, including some ‘non-propositions’) is found most directly in PI 23, at which point ‘the author of the *Tractatus*’ is directly criticized for overlooking their variety.

Consider the variety of language-games in the following examples, and in others:

- Giving orders, and acting on them –
- Describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurements –
- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –
- Reporting an event –
- Speculating about the event –
- Forming and testing a hypothesis –
- Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams –
- Making up a story; and reading one –
- Acting in a play –
- Singing rounds –
- Guessing riddles –
- Cracking a joke; telling one –
- Solving a problem in applied arithmetic –
- Translating from one language into another –
- Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

– It is interesting to compare the diversity of the tools of language and of the ways they are used, the diversity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (This includes the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.) (PI 23)

There should be no presumption that all such examples will be used in the very same ways or obey the very same rules, just as there should be no such presumption about all the things we call ‘games’ (e.g., the rules and workings of chess are quite different from the rules of solitaire, even if we might also find similarities). As emphasized in PI 69-71, this does not reveal a *deficiency* in our concepts of ‘game’ or ‘proposition’, it is just a fact about their uses which does not lead to any special difficulties in practice. (Notice that, at least prior to Wittgenstein’s work, no one was especially concerned to find a rigid and timeless definition of the word ‘game’, as noted in PI 68.)<sup>17</sup> Whether a more precise definition of ‘game’ or ‘proposition’

---

<sup>17</sup> Suits (1978) offers a tempting philosophical definition of ‘game’: ‘the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles’. Even assuming this were true of all ‘games’ (questionable since

or ‘number’ is needed will ultimately depend on one’s purposes and the situation at hand (c.f., PI 17). It would be a mistake to suggest that, in the absence of a more precise definition, we do not ordinarily know what ‘game’ means (PI 70). If we *insist* on an artificial uniformity across all uses in the name of precision-for-its-own-sake, then this is bound to lead to confusions about how ‘game’, ‘proposition’, or ‘number’ are ordinarily used (PI 100, 107, 108).

PI 136 continues Wittgenstein’s thought about using ‘This is how things are’ as the general form of propositions, but this time with the variant, ‘Such-and-such is true’.

At bottom, giving “This is how things are” as the general form of propositions is the same as giving the explanation: a proposition is whatever can be true or false. For instead of “This is how things are”, I could just as well have said “Such-and-such is true”. (Or again, “Such-and-such is false”.) But

‘p’ is true = p  
‘p’ is false = not-p<sup>18</sup>

And to say that a proposition is whatever can be true or false amounts to saying: we call something a proposition if *in our language* we apply the calculus of truth functions to it. (PI 136)

Thus, if someone said that all ‘propositions’ tell us that ‘Such-and-such is true’, then this will be as unhelpful as assimilating them to the schema ‘This is how things are’. One important reason for the unhelpfulness of *this* expression (‘Such-and-such is true’) is that there is no special difference between saying p and saying ‘p’ is true (or between saying not-p and ‘p’ is false). If saying p is just a way of saying ‘p’ is true, and vice versa, then it is difficult to see how ‘Such-and-such is true’ would reveal the essential, inner-workings of propositions. At best, it reveals the trivial

---

games used for learning language would all involve obstacles *necessary* for learning language, itself a *necessity* for day to day life), Wittgenstein’s point would remain that the definition itself could only be understood by elaborating examples. Perhaps the deeper issue here is that (for Wittgenstein) one does not show that a concept (e.g. ‘game’) is *not* a family resemblance concept by replacing it with a concatenation of (what Wittgenstein would equally take to be) family resemblance concepts (‘voluntary’, ‘attempt’, ‘unnecessary’, ‘obstacle’). Compare PI 87. See Klagge (2022) for further discussion.

<sup>18</sup> Baker & Hacker (2005) highlight technical deficiencies in the formula Wittgenstein uses here: ‘The formula “‘p’ is true = p” is unhappy. First of all, it is not the sign “p” or the *sentence* “p” that can be said to be true or false, but what is said by its use. [...] Secondly, the formula “p is true” is also ungrammatical. The predicate “. . . is true” demands a nominal – as in “That p is true”. And so does the truth-operator – as in “It is true that p”’ (291-292). On my reading of PI 136, the major philosophical point Wittgenstein intends to make in this passage, however, is not defeated by these technical issues. Indeed, if he had replaced his formula above with something like (T) stated earlier in this paper, the same reflections would apply. – The lack of technical care Wittgenstein put into his statement of this formula might itself be an indication that he was not interested in technical details, especially of the sort that deflationists would make central to their accounts of truth.

and uninteresting fact that ‘we call something a proposition if *in our language* we apply the calculus of truth functions to it.’

However, it might have looked like we were on to some kind of explanation about what propositions *really* are.

Now it looks as if the explanation – a proposition is whatever can be true or false – determined what a proposition was, by saying: what fits the concept ‘true’, or what the concept ‘true’ fits, is a proposition. So it is as if we had a concept of true and false, which we could use to ascertain what is, and what is not, a proposition. What *engages* with the concept of truth (as with a cog-wheel) is a proposition. (*ibid.*)

So, in other words, it might seem as if we had an antecedent and independent grasp of ‘true’, which we could then use to reveal what a proposition really is. A ‘proposition’ is what fits the concept ‘true’, or vice versa. But Wittgenstein then explains why a temptation to unify propositions (or truth) in this manner rests on a misunderstanding.

But this is a bad picture. It is as if one were to say “The chess king is *the* piece that one puts in check”. But this can mean no more than that in our game of chess only the king is put in check. Just as the proposition that only a *proposition* can be true can say no more than that we predicate “true” and “false” only of what we call a proposition. And what a proposition is, is in *one* sense determined by the rules of sentence formation (in English, for example), and in another sense by the use of the sign in the language-game. And the use of the words “true” and “false” may also be a constituent part of this game; and we treat it as *belonging* to our concept ‘proposition’, but it doesn’t *fit* [that concept]. As we might also say, check *belongs* to our concept of the chess king (as, so to speak, a constituent part of it). (*ibid.*)

To explain what propositions fundamentally are by appeal to the fact that they are those things to which we apply ‘true’ and ‘false’ is misguided because it tells us almost nothing about how one is to use a particular proposition, or ‘true’ or ‘false’ as applied to it, in any given case. We don’t have an antecedent understanding of those uses prior to seeing them, describing them, or acting them out.

To explain the concept of ‘proposition’ with the concept ‘true’ is thus akin to explaining what the chess king is by saying, ‘It’s the piece that one puts in check’, as if the concept of ‘check’ were somehow prior to or more fundamental than the concept of ‘king’ in chess. But what does it mean to put something in check? The meaning of ‘check’, just as the meaning of ‘king’, needs to be explained by providing the rules of the game or (if those leave room for confusion) showing how the game is played via example. Thus, ‘king’ and ‘check’ are (conceptually) on a par – they *both* need to be explained by showing how the game in which they are

used works; one does not ‘reveal the essence’ of the other. These concepts ‘belong’ to one another, but one does not ‘fit’ the other (in some metaphysical sense of the word). The same goes for ‘true’, ‘false’, and ‘proposition’: to understand any of these concepts, we need to understand the language-games in which they are *together* used.<sup>19</sup>

This last point deserves a special highlight. *Any* of these concepts need to be understood via the language-games in which they are used. The formula “‘p’ is true = p’ neither explains the various roles of ‘proposition’ *nor* the various roles of ‘true’ and ‘false’. To understand those roles, one needs to return ‘back to the rough ground!’ (PI 107) as Wittgenstein puts it – to describe their workings as they feature in our complicated life with them. The idea that “‘p’ is true = p’ tells us a complete story about *either* ‘propositions’ *or* about ‘true’ and ‘false’ is thus diametrically opposed to the general spirit of these passages.<sup>20</sup> But the formula *does* illustrate *something* about the relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘propositions’, namely that they ‘belong’ together – that they are learned together and (at least for us) are conceptually inseparable. To say that they are inseparable is *not* to say that one serves as the foundation of the other – but rather that they are conceptually on a par.<sup>21</sup> The reciprocal relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’ is stated briefly but clearly in later passages.

The word “accord” and the word “rule” are *related* to one another; they are cousins. If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it. (PI 224)

The use of the word “rule” and the use of the word “same” are interwoven. (As are the use of “proposition” and the use of “true”.) (PI 225)

This is the major lesson that Wittgenstein intends to illustrate with the formula “‘p’ is true = p’”: that the concepts ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’ are interwoven, that they are related to one another, that they are (metaphorically speaking) ‘cousins’. Neither serves as the foundation for the other – neither serves to reveal ‘the essence’ of the

---

<sup>19</sup> Wittgenstein thereby challenges his own earlier temptation to seek ‘the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, inference, truth, experience, and so forth’ as if this order were ‘a *super-order* between – so to speak – *super-concepts*’ (PI 97). He reminds himself that ‘if the words “language”, “experience”, “world” have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words “table”, “lamp”, “door”’ (*ibid.*) – an effective comparison for PI 136 since there is little temptation to treat any of these words as (conceptually or metaphysically) more fundamental than the others.

<sup>20</sup> Compare Blackburn (1998, 164): ‘We see then how the true Wittgenstein thinks, to use his words, that while the clothing of our language makes everything alike, it masks a prodigious underlying diversity, and that it is the task of the philosopher to confront that diversity. He is in fact diametrically opposed to minimalism.’

<sup>21</sup> Compare Putnam (1999, 67): ‘we must not confuse what are virtually tautologies for metaphysical discoveries. The notion of truth and the notion of a proposition mesh together like a pair of gears in a machine; neither is a foundation on which the other rests’.

other. To understand the concepts of truth and proposition, we must look to the complicated variety of their uses in our life with them.<sup>22</sup>

In section 6, I will explain why my contextualized reading of PI 134-136 clearly distinguishes Wittgenstein from deflationism as that position is typically defined.

## 6. Why later Wittgenstein was not a Deflationist (as commonly defined)

Given my contextualized reading of PI 134-136, we should not consider Wittgenstein to be a deflationist as that position is typically understood. Deflationists claim that once we recognize the correctness of all instances of (T) and the merely expressive role of truth for formulating certain generalizations, we have said all there is to say about the concept of truth. On their view, the concept of a proposition is more fundamental than that of truth and a more interesting subject of inquiry. As Horwich puts it, ‘there is a correct order of grounding among [the concepts of truth and meaning]—a definite hierarchy whereby the more superficial ones [such as ‘truth’] reduce to the more basic ones [such as meaning]’ (Horwich 2010, 113). Wittgenstein agrees with deflationists that the schema (T) (and its variants) tells us very little – that it highlights a rather thin and superficial aspect of ‘truth’. But Wittgenstein, as my reading suggests, would disagree completely with the idea that schema (T) tells us the full story about ‘truth’, or that ‘truth’ is somehow ‘less fundamental’ or ‘more superficial’ than the concepts of meaning and proposition.

Wittgenstein, after all, invites us to ask: How do we *use* the word ‘true’? How does it relate to other concepts such as ‘knowledge’, ‘accuracy’, ‘correctness’, ‘success’, ‘honesty’, ‘sincerity’, ‘lying’, and the like? (These are plausibly *also* ‘conceptual cousins’ of ‘truth’.)<sup>23</sup> How should we understand the life of someone who identifies as a ‘truth-seeker’, of someone who dedicates their life to ‘the truth’? (Wittgenstein once wrote to his sister, after she praised him for his great philosophical talents, ‘Call me a truth-seeker and I will be satisfied’.)<sup>24</sup> – These are

---

<sup>22</sup> Although McFarland (2020) may be right that these remarks are intended as a setup for Wittgenstein’s subsequent discussion about rules, my summary of the major lessons here show why I disagree with his general reading that the purpose of PI 136 is merely ‘to function as a segue, a way of introducing themes pertinent to subjects that will play a more significant role later in the *Investigations*’ (1523). By contrast, PI 134-136 marks a significant therapeutic breakthrough in its own right – though indeed not one that can be understood independently of the methodology and trajectory of the work as a whole.

<sup>23</sup> In light of the relations between ‘truth’ and a wide range of other ‘conceptual relatives’, I disagree with Wawrzyniak’s (2023) suggestion that ‘if the redundancy conception of truth boils down to just the claims that (1) “‘p’ is true = p” is a rule of grammar in the Wittgensteinian sense of the term and (2) the phrase “is true” can be eliminated from our language without diminishing its means of expression, then Wittgenstein’s remarks on truth may be considered to be in line with it’ (23). It is unclear that one can even imagine a simple elimination of ‘true’ from our language given just how bound up it is with our understanding of so many other modes of expression.

<sup>24</sup> See Nedo & Ranchetti (1983).



all intelligible questions for Wittgenstein and none that require any sort of reduction to the schema (T) or to the merely ‘expressive’ role of ‘truth’ insisted on by deflationists. Rather, according to Wittgenstein, they require an effort to describe their workings in a wide variety of examples – against the philosophical temptation to reduce any one of them to a single formula.

Someone might object: ‘But Wittgenstein still agrees with the deflationists that “truth” is not a special metaphysical property – since he thinks its workings are revealed simply by describing language-games. So doesn’t he still agree with deflationists that truth is not metaphysically “special” or “mysterious”?’ It’s true: Wittgenstein’s remarks are hostile to the so-called *substantive* theories of truth – but they are equally hostile to the aims of deflationism.<sup>25</sup> Deflationism wants to tell us a simple yet complete story about the role of truth in our lives. Its story requires drawing an asymmetry between ‘truth’ and ‘propositions’ – the former is thin and superficial while the latter is a genuine subject of inquiry. But Wittgenstein claims that ‘truth’ and ‘proposition’ are conceptually on a par, that neither can be understood independently of the other, that neither is more fundamental than the other. And this is the lesson that Wittgenstein draws from schema (T) itself (or at least a close variant)<sup>26</sup> – a very different lesson than is drawn from it by deflationists. This goes completely against the deflationist’s proposal that (T) (and its ‘expressive’ role) tells us the complete story about ‘truth’.

It is tempting to think that the deflationist’s avoidance of any ‘substantive theory of truth’ is akin to Wittgenstein’s ‘non-theoretical’ approach – what I earlier referred to as Wittgenstein’s therapeutic conception of philosophy. But my reading reveals that this too would be a mischaracterization of Wittgenstein. The proposal offered by deflationists is just as much the sort of ‘theory’ Wittgenstein would oppose as is the ‘theory’ offered by, say, ‘correspondence theorists of truth’. The fundamental concern about ‘theory’ in the *Investigations* is that it encourages us to depart from an honest effort to study the details of word-use – or to see all of language through the arbitrary requirements of said ‘theory’ (PI 101, 103, 107, 114). Attention to those details reveals the limitations of any such theory – it shows that a ‘theory’ never tells the full story about our lives with words.<sup>27</sup>

A question like ‘what is the general form of truth and of the proposition?’ – that could only be satisfied by such a theory – should thus be abandoned as unanswerable. The deflationist, it seems, has been seduced by the very sorts of theoretical temptations that seduced Wittgenstein in his writing of the *Tractatus*, where he thought he could tell the complete story about language. When that story was finally told, he thought it revealed the true ‘value of this work’ namely ‘that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved’ (TLP, Preface). The deflationist likewise assumes that a simple story can be told about the general form

---

<sup>25</sup> Again, contrary to Connelly’s (2013) proposal that ‘Wittgenstein defends a robust and substantive, rather than deflationary conception of truth-aptness’ (571).

<sup>26</sup> See fn. 18.

<sup>27</sup> Especially given that, as Wittgenstein emphasizes, our language-games change over time: “And this diversity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten” (PI 23).

of ‘truth’ – a story that shows just how little is achieved by this concept in our life. But Wittgenstein’s critique of the oversimplifying demands that led to his account of ‘the essence of the proposition’ applies *mutatis mutandis* to the concept of truth. The problem about ‘truth’, if there is one, is not that there is so little to say, but rather that there is too much to say than can be confined to a narrow formula.

To sum up my reading: Wittgenstein was not a deflationist (as commonly defined) for at least two reasons.

1. Wittgenstein resisted simple formalistic accounts of the concepts of truth and proposition – and his grounds for resistance arise from various commitments that are central to his later philosophy (especially by contrast with his ‘older way of thinking’)
2. Wittgenstein, unlike deflationists, did not view the concepts of truth and proposition in asymmetrical terms (e.g., the former as thin or trivial by contrast with the latter) – but viewed them as on a par and understood by the diverse roles they play *together* in different language-games

## 7. A Unique Brand of Deflationism?

Perhaps someone will conclude from the foregoing that Wittgenstein simply had a unique *brand* of deflationism, but was nonetheless a deflationist (in some broader sense of that -ism). All of this hinges on how we define ‘deflationism’. If deflationism is simply the project of undermining metaphysical inquiry into the fundamental essence or nature of truth, then Wittgenstein (on this quite broad definition) was a deflationist. If deflationism is more specifically the project of undermining such inquiry via a precise formal characterization of the role of the truth predicate, which shows that it leaves no room for metaphysical inquiry, then it is in *that* sense that Wittgenstein was not a deflationist. My understanding is that the latter more specific project is the usual sense of ‘deflationism’ in contemporary analytic philosophy, and that the broader approach might be called ‘deflation-ary’ but not ‘deflation-ism’.

However, if one prefers the broader characterization of deflationism, then my reading is compatible with Wittgenstein having a ‘deflationist’ stance on the concept of truth in the *Philosophical Investigations*. If we were to mark off his particular brand of deflationism so broadly understood, I would suggest that it is best labelled as ‘therapeutic deflationism’ to highlight his distinctive methodological approach. But these are just matters of useful labelling. As Wittgenstein puts it, ‘Say what you please, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing how things are’ (PI 79). The utmost aim of this article was to clarify ‘how things are’ with respect to the later Wittgenstein’s views on ‘truth’, and how they differ in important ways from ‘deflationism’ as it is commonly understood.

## Acknowledgments

Thanks to Alex Campbell, Chris Dorst, Alan Nelson, and Ram Neta for comments. Thanks to Corey Dethier, Tamara Fakhoury, Jessica Gordon-Roth, Riki Heck, Cat St. Croix, James Woodbridge and the UMN Philosophy Department Works in Progress Series for helpful conversation.

## References

Armour-Garb, B. & Woodbridge, J. forthcoming. *The Deflationary Approach to Truth: A Guide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baker, G.P. & Hacker, P.M.S. *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part II: Exegesis 1-184*. Second extensively revised edition by P.M.S. Hacker. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Bartunek, N. 2019. "Truth in the *Investigations*". *Synthese* 196: 4091-4111.

Blackburn, S. 1998. 'Wittgenstein, Wright, Rory and Minimalism'. *Mind* Vol. 107, 425, 157-182.

Blackburn, S. 2010. 'Wittgenstein's Irrealism'. Reprinted in *Practical Tortoise raising and other philosophical essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bold, P. 2022. *Three Essays on Later Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics: Reality, Determination, and Infinity*, PhD Diss., Chapel Hill: UNC.

Bold, P. 2023. "Crossing Pictures of 'Determination' in Wittgenstein's Remarks on Rule-Following." *Philosophical Investigations* 47 (1): 32–52.

Bold, P. 2024a. "Later Wittgenstein on 'Truth' and Realism in Mathematics." *Philosophy* 99 (1): 27–51.

Bold, P. 2024b. "From Pictures to Employments: Later Wittgenstein on 'The Infinite'". *Inquiry*, DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2024.2367041

Connelly, J. 2013. "Wittgenstein, Non-Factualism, and Deflationism". *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 21:4, 559-585.

Davidson, D. 1984. *Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, D. 1996. 'The Folly of Trying to Define Truth'. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 93, No. 6, 263-278.

Dummett, M. 1978. *Truth and Other Enigmas*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Field, H. 1994. "Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content". *Mind*, 103:411, 249-285.

Hacker, P.M.S. 2001. *Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hacker, P.M.S. 2021. *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*. Third Edition. Anthem Press.

Horwich, P. 1998. *Meaning*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Horwich, P. 2010. *Truth – Meaning – Reality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Horwich, P. 2018. 'Wittgenstein on Truth and Meaning'. *Australasian Philosophical Review*, 2:3, 285-298.

Klagge, J. 2022. "Wittgenstein vs. Socrates: Wittgenstein and Plato". In *Greek and Contemporary Philosophies of Language Face to Face*, ed. Begoña Ramón Cámara, Special Issue of JoLMA: The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts, vol. 3, no. 1, June 2022, pp. 69-84.

Kripke, S. 1982. *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McFarland, A.L. 2020. "Wittgenstein and Redundant Truth". *Philosophia* 48: 1515-1525.

McGinn, M. 1984. *Wittgenstein on Meaning*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Nedo, M. & Ranchetti, M. 1983. *Wittgenstein Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt.

Putnam, H. 1999. *The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World*. Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Strawson, P.F. 1949. 'Truth'. *Analysis*, Vol 9, No. 6, pp. 83-97.

Suits, B. 1978. *The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia*. Broadview Press.

Wawrzyniak, J. 2023. "Wittgenstein on Truth: Some Remarks on Paragraphs 134-7 of *Philosophical Investigations*". *Analiza I Egzystencja* 63: 5-26.

Wittgenstein, L. 1979. *Notebooks, 1914-1916*. G. H. von Wright & G. E. M. Anscombe (eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (NB)

Wittgenstein, L. 1961. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (trans.). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (TLP)

Wittgenstein, L. 1974. *Philosophical Grammar*. In R. Rhees (ed.), A. Kenny (trans.). Oxford: Blackwell. (PG)

Wittgenstein, L. (2012). *Big Typescript: TS 213*. In C. G. Luckhardt and M. Aue (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell. (BT)

Wittgenstein, L. 2009. *Philosophical Investigations*. Revised 4<sup>th</sup> Edition, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (trans.). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (PI)

Wittgenstein, L. 1969. *On Certainty*. G.E.M Anscombe, G.H. von Wright (eds.) Denis Paul, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (OC)